The Framers interminably debated
every little detail of the Constitution. Did they end up getting it right? The
Civil War indicates they may have.
Nothing puts stress on government
more than war. Especially, a civil war. Superficially, the Confederate
Constitution appeared very similar to the United States Constitution. However,
there were differences. The Confederate Constitution openly used the word
slavery, where the Framers adopted the euphemic, “other persons.” Many of the
Framers abhorred slavery and refused to see it referred to outright in the
language of the Constitution. The Confederacy made more than semantic changes.
In their minds, they corrected errors they felt were decided improperly
seventy-three years prior. Some of these, arguably, contributed to the South
losing the War for Southern Independence.
In Philadelphia, the Framers
argued numerous times over the proper length of term for the president. Some
wanted a short term with re-electability, others wanted a long term with no
re-electability. The Constitutional Convention settled on a four-year term with
unrestricted re-electability, which the Twenty-Second Amendment limited to two
terms. The Confederate Constitution adopted a six-year term with no
re-electability.
In 1787, most southern delegates
to the Constitutional Convention believed the executive should be nonpolitical,
so when they had a chance to write their own constitution, they gave the
president the liberty to abstain from politicking. With an above-the-fray
executive, they then felt comfortable giving the president more power. Under the
Confederate Constitution, the president had a line-item veto and Congress,
without a two-thirds majority, could not appropriate money unless requested by
the president. In essence, this shifted the power of the purse from Congress to
the president.
Jefferson Davis never ran for
president. He was selected for one six-year term and, for the most part,
ignored politics. Davis was an iconic figure for the Confederate cause, while
at the same time, the public held Congress in low regard. Davis used the disparity
in their respective reputations to neglect Congress. He did not host meals with
congressional leaders, provide patronage, help legislative candidates, speak
highly of people to the press, or support bills sponsored by powerful
legislators. He openly displayed impatience with people who disagreed with him.
As an indicator of Davis’ distain for Congress, he wrote, “Now when we require
the brains and the heart of the country in the legislative halls of the
Confederacy and of the States, all must have realized how much it is
otherwise.” A Charleston Mercury reporter wrote, “He regards any question put
to him by Congress as a presumptuous interference in matters which do not
concern them.”
Lincoln did not have that luxury.
The U.S. Congress constantly challenged his war decisions. The Joint Committee
on the Conduct of the War, commonly referred to as the War Committee, used
oversight powers to wield a potent check on the executive branch. The committee
investigated battle defeats, war profiteering, Confederate atrocities, and
generally stuck its nose in wherever it wanted. Members often leaked testimony
and criticisms to the press, which caused distrust in the War Department and
the Union Army. While the Confederate Congress met in secret, the Union
Congress broadcast its proceedings at the top of its lungs.
Presidential politicking of
congress was one of the great differences between the Union and Confederate
governments, but did this affect the outcome of the war? Perhaps, and perhaps
significantly.
Lincoln smooched Congress to get
legislation passed, appropriations approved, and to garner support for
reelection. It may not have felt good to Lincoln at the time, but this constant
politicking brought many more minds to the task, built comradery, provided a vent
for mistakes, and may have tamped down some ill-conceived moves. The War
Committee harangued Lincoln and his cabinet throughout the conflict, but by
acting as the catalyst for aggressive debate, the committee may have helped win
the war. It certainly caused Lincoln to think long and hard about what needed
to be done and how he would get various factions behind his proposed actions.
Near the end of the war, Lincoln
won reelection and enjoyed substantial popularity in government and the states
that remained in the Union, while the Confederate Congress tried to force
President Davis to replace his entire cabinet, stripped him of his
commander-in-chief authority, and threatened a vote of no confidence. By this
time, of course, a Union victory had become obvious, affecting the respective
reputations of the presidents. But Davis has gone down in history as
cantankerous, aloof, and averse to taking advice. Perhaps if he had been
required to build relationships with the other people in government, the South
could have leveraged their early victories to achieve a different outcome.
Did the hyper-political Abraham
Lincoln have an advantage over the standoffish Jefferson Davis? Probably. An
engaged president knows the thinking of other players and can more easily leverage
strengths and mitigate weaknesses. If this be the case, then the Founding
Fathers got it right when they settled on a short presidential term with
re-electability.